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● Reductions in adherence to NPIs (including case and household isolation) will have 
more impact than any marginal benefits generated from a staggered return of students 
to university.
● The emergence of more transmissible new variants results in impaired effectiveness of 
mass asymptomatic testing.
● We observe evidence of spillover transmission between higher education and the wider 
community in some, but not all, settings.
Executive Summary – Key Findings
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1. Impact of staggering on student return
- We note there may be operational reasons why a staggered return at HE institutions is desired, such 
as testing capacity. This only considers the direct impact on transmission and isolation. 
- However, under a staggered return, higher infection prevalence amongst returning students 
increases the prospect of repeated isolation of households.
- In absence of other controls, staggering can reduce and delay the size of the infection peak, though 
reductions in attack rate are slight (given the assumption that individuals do not “compensate” to 
replace contacts that were unable to occur due to everyone not having returned.)
- Strong adherence to isolation, test and trace guidance remains crucial in order to break chains of 
transmission and effectively reduce the likelihood of large scale outbreaks.
2. Asymptomatic testing
- Testing upon return: including a second LFT, with no contacts occurring between the two tests, is 
estimated to cause a minor decrease in attack rate.
- Regular mass testing/screening: in the presence of a more transmissible variant, testing has a 
decreased ability to control case numbers.




3. Infection risk in residential student halls
- Analysis of one HE institution found that students living in larger halls were at higher risk of SARS-
CoV-2 infection in the autumn term
- We did not find evidence of a dependence on household secondary attack rate with household size, 
potentially suggesting household structures are less important than hall capacity.
4. Transmission to/from the community
- Importations into the student population from the community AND to the community from student 
populations do occur.
- We do not find a consistent indication of student-community transmission spillover across studied 
LTLAs. 
- Where there is an indicative signal of transmission spillover, there is some correlation between the 
size of a university outbreak and the strength/robustness of the spillover signal.
Executive Summary (2)
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- Readers should focus on the high-level, qualitative insights offered from these analyses 
rather than the specific findings or quantitative figures from individual modelling 
contributions. A number of these analyses are based on insights from individual institutions, or 
parameterised using data from a specific HEI.
- Testing scenarios within HE and the potential implications of increased transmissibility of a new 
SARS-CoV-2 variant for HE are considered. However, these are initial insights and further work is 
needed (though not necessarily specific to the HE sector).




1.  Impact of staggering student return
We consider insights from:
A. Simple model of isolation upon return only 
Three spread models considering the impact of staggering over time
B. Simple SIR model
C. Network model
D. Stochastic compartmental model
Please note that the model C and D are parameterised using data on 
(different) individual HE institutions 
1a. Impact of staggering on student isolation upon return
For low rates of +ve tests, staggering reduces 
the total days spent in isolation on return. For 
higher rates, staggering leads to repeated 
isolation of households and to long waiting times 
for students whose household is isolating.
We take the household distribution from one English HE institution. Students take one test and if +ve all 
students in the household that have arrived isolate, whilst all students that are planning to return to campus are 
delayed.
w/ staggering w/o staggering







0.005 1251 278 2201
0.01 2717 596 4371
0.02 5204 1041 7997
Only considering isolation on return -
spread on campus not simulated here.
Stagger return distribution: 30% between days 0 and 13 (uniformly distributed), 
7 days break, 70% between days 21 and 34 (uniformly distributed).
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We first investigate the impact of staggering using a simple SIR model
● We assume N students return in three equal stages of N/3 students each week
○ i.e. we assume populations N/3, 2N/3, N for weeks 1,2,3-11
● Once at university the students interact without any restraint (density dependent 
mixing assumption).
● When each group of students return, we assumed a fraction p to be infected:
○ p*N/3 returnees are infected
○ (1-p)*N/3 returnees are susceptible. 
● Run model for an 11 week term
1b. Impact of staggering over time: Mean Field SIR Model
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Staggered return No staggering
Lower prevalence on return
Baseline parameter set
RIS 9
Staggered return No staggering
● Staggering reduces and delays the size of the infection peak
● Long term impact is relatively small
Increased transmissibility
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● Student population: 25,000 (~7,000 on-campus, ~18,000 off-campus)
● Four contact layers: Household, study/coursemates, organised society & sports clubs, social.
○ If an individual is not isolating, but planned contacts do not occur due to corresponding individuals not 
having yet returned to university or being in isolation, no “compensatory” contacts are made.
● Model calibration: In absence of controls, early period 7-day averaged R returns a 50% prediction interval 
spanning 3-4.
● Parameter uncertainty: In each simulation run, several variables were sampled from a prior probability 
distribution. 
● Time horizon: 11 weeks (1 week before term + 10 week term).
● Four staggering scenarios: 1,000 simulations per scenario (20 
runs per network realisation, 50 distinct network realisations)
● Testing on return:
○ Default strategy: Two LFTs, spaced three days apart. 
Positive result underwent confirmatory PCR.
○ Test sensitivity dependent on time since infection;
○ Equivalent for asymptomatics & symptomatics.
1c. Impact of staggering over time: Network Model
Figure: proportion of students returning under four 
staggering scenarios; three weekend pulse by course
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Figure: Attack rate distributions under differing assumptions for adherence to isolation, test and trace measures, in combination with 
strategies for staggered return of all students. White squares represent the medians. Solid black lines depict the interquartile range.
● Adherence to isolation guidance and following test and trace procedures is crucial in reducing the overall 
case burden within the student population.
● Our considered collection of staggering strategies, in which all students ultimately return, have minimal 
impact on the attack rate.
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As for the simple 
model, staggering 
slightly reduces and 
delays the size of 
the peak but the 
long term impact is 
minimal.
Risk of outbreaks of 
campus is 
significantly reduced 
with high levels of 
adherence to testing 
and isolation.
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Figure: Distributions of estimated proportion of time students spend in isolation under differing assumptions for adherence to 
isolation, test and trace measures, in combination with strategies for staggered return of all students. White squares represent the 
medians and solid black lines the interquartile range. We consider two measures:  (Left) Per each student; (Right) Per adherent student.
● A collective response (high adherence) reduces the time each adherent is estimated to spend in isolation.
● The staggered strategy generally lowers the expected time spent in isolation
○ Caveat: For those students waiting to return to university, we only account for isolation due to onset of 
symptoms (possible isolation due to household member infection or via contact tracing away from 
university not included).
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● Student population: 28,000
● Contact matrices: Household, study and random contacts based on survey data, 160 groups based on 
school and year.
● Model calibration: In absence of controls, assumed that asymptomatic cases are 50% less infectious 
than symptomatic cases, gave R~3, calibrated to estimations at the start of the academic year.
● Main parameters
○ Mean probability of a case being asymptomatic: 75%
○ Relative infectiousness of an asymptomatic: varied between 0 and 1
○ Self-isolation rates: 0.5 for symptomatics, testing scenario dependent for asymptomatics.
○ Probability student remained in university accommodation during vacation: 20%
● Time horizon: Run from the start of the academic year for 300 days. 
These scenarios assess what impact staggering and testing upon return may have had at the start of the 
2020/2021 academic year, if this had taken place. The model parameters do not change based on events that 
have happened since the beginning of the academic year and consequently the results are to be interpreted 
qualitatively.
1d. Impact of staggering over time: Stochastic compartmental 
Model
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Four scenarios are considered:
● No staggering
● 14 day spread
● 28 day spread
● Staggering by school/year 
groups over five weeks, 
prioritising “practical” courses
● Similar overall case burden 
across all considered 
staggering strategies.
● Relative to no stagger return, 
lower prevalence in early phase 
paired with higher prevalence in 
late phase (14 day and 28 day 
stagger strategies)
● With the inclusion of testing 
upon return of all students, we 
observe similar temporal 
trends. 16
2.  Asymptomatic testing
We consider insights from two network models. These are parameterised to 
(different) individual HE institutions 
Figure: Relative attack rate distributions under different test before return 
to study procedures, in combination with strategies for staggered 
student return. 




A ✅ ❌ ✅ N/A
B ✅ ✅ ✅ ❌
C ✅ ✅ ✅ ✅
D ✅ ❌ ❌ N/A
E ✅ ✅ ❌ ❌
F ✅ ✅ ❌ ✅
G Single PCR test only
Given high adherence to interventions and engagement with rapid testing:
● Inclusion of second LFT and isolation between the LFTs gives minor reductions in attack rate.
● Distributions comparable across considered staggering strategies.
Assumed 90% adhere to isolation, test and trace guidance. For test strategies using two LFTs, the two tests were spaced three days apart. Specificity of 
both PCR and LFT was assumed to be 100% (we acknowledge that is high for LFT, where 99.7%(ish) would be more appropriate). White squares represent 
the medians. Solid black lines the interquartile range.
2a. Impact of return testing strategies with staggering 
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● SEAIR network model simulating contact within households and in other settings (e.g. social, teaching, 
sport), including pre-symptomatic and asymptomatic individuals.
● 15,000 students in population - household sizes approximating household size distributions in a 
university setting (25% of size 10, 50% of size 7, 25% of size 5).
● Consider impact of no asymptomatic testing and three competing asymptomatic testing strategies:
(i) No asymptomatic testing
(ii) Weekly household-pooled PCR testing
(iii) Weekly half-household pooled PCR testing
(iv) Random asymptomatic testing (covering 50% population weekly)
● We assume 50% probability of each non-household contact of a test-positive being traced and isolated.
● Household immediately isolates upon a positive test or symptoms, but household members do not 
isolate from one another.
● Household contacts infect with probability 0.2/day for “old variant”, 0.3/day for “new variant” (an increase 
of x1.5). Additional group contacts transmit at rate 1/10th of household contacts.
2b. Impact of Asymptomatic Testing in Higher Education
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Old-variant New-variant (transmission probs increased x1.5)
Each line represents 500 model runs, with envelopes corresponding to 95% prediction intervals.
• Observe increased cases with more transmissible variant, decreased ability of (particularly) 
partial-population weekly screening to control case numbers. 
• Very large outbreaks are almost certain without any regular asymptomatic testing when 
considering variants with increased transmissibility
Impact of Asymptomatic Testing in Higher Education
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3.  Infection risk in residential student 
halls
Self-reported data from one English HE Institution indicate that during the Autumn 2020 term students residing in halls were more likely to 
have a confirmed SARS-CoV-2 infection compared to students living in other accommodation types. Here we examine the distribution of 
self-reported positive pillar 2 test results within halls and their associated households. 
Hall secondary attack rate 
Table 1: Results of univariate and 
multivariate logistic regression analysis 
for predictors of the hall SAR.
Figure 1: Univariate analysis: reported 
confirmed hall SAR by hall capacity (top 
left) and median household size (left). 
Multivariate analysis: reported confirmed 
hall SAR by hall capacity and median 
household size (above). Error bars 
represent 95% CI.
Infection risk in residential student halls
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Household secondary attack rate
Summary: Analysis of one HE institution found that students living in larger halls were at 
higher risk of SARS-CoV-2 infection in the autumn term. We did not find evidence of a 
dependence on household SAR with household size, potentially suggesting household 
structures are less important than hall capacity.
Figure 3 (left): Probability of at least one reported confirmed case by household size.
Binomial probability of student in infected household reporting was:
● 0.0758541 (95% CI:[0.0638065, 0.0893653]) between all reported cases.
● 0.0568345 (95% CI:[0.0452513, 0.0703324]) between symptomatic cases.
These estimates do not correct for underascertainment of household infections
(asymptomatic cases, underreporting, etc.), and thus likely represent a lower limit. 
Figure 2 (right): We test for predictors of the 
symptomatic reported confirmed household SAR 
within households. (Left) Household size not 
significant (p = 0.14) by logit regression. (Right) Date 
of first infection in household significant (p <0.0001) 
by logit regression. This may be due to a number of 
effects including shifts in background prevalence, or 
changes in mixing and/or reporting behaviour.
A significant caveat is that we have incomplete data on student households (missing for approximately 50% of reported confirmed 
tests) and although some serological data is available, collection was not designed to address details of transmission within halls. 
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4. Transmission to/from the community 
We consider insights from:
A. Analysis of expected and observed incoming infections
B. Case study of test positive rates for one campus relative to the LA
C. Analysis of positive cases at MSOA and LTLA level
● We calculate expected incoming infection numbers 
at a sample of 72 UK universities based on 2018 
HESA data on their student intake by UK region and 
prevalence by region at the end of Sept 2020. 
● We use data from the UCU dashboard in Nov 2020 
on the cumulative number of student infections at 
these universities to define an outbreak. 
● We plot the observed fraction of universities with an 
outbreak and a theoretical outbreak probability 
based on the extinction probability p for a single 
incoming infection. Here we use a flat threshold of 
200 cases.
● Using MLE we fit the extinction probability as 0.958, 
95% confidence interval [0.945 0.972]. The fit is 
reasonable suggesting that incoming infections are a 
fairly good predictor of outbreaks.
Threshold 200 cases
4a. Impact of initial incoming infections on university outbreaks
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● Higher thresholds for outbreak definition 
increase p: a threshold of 400 gives 
p=0.979 (95% confidence interval [0.971 
0.987]).
● Higher incoming case numbers are likely 
to increase the probability of an outbreak 
at a university.
● We would expect a lower extinction 
probability for a more transmissible 
SARS-CoV-2 variant. As a 




Rates of new COVID-19 infections among 
a population of university students at one 
HE institution appear very similar to those 
for the general community aged 20 to 24 
in that local authority, and slightly lower 
than those in the 15-19 age group. 
Caveats / confounding factors:
● Students are included in LA figures
● Asymptomatic screening in student 
population
● About 15% of students are aged 
25+
● Not all students physically located 
in the LA
4b. A case study - comparison of test positive rates on one 
English campus and the Local Authority 
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Variable testing rates and students not being registered at their term-time address are key confounders in the data.
These are all indicators of correlation, and not causation. It is possible that the higher transmission among students 
(often due to larger household sizes and mixing) merely amplified underlying national dynamics, which needed 2-3 more 
weeks before being visible in the community cases.
● We investigate the potential for spillover from higher education to the community, analysing data at 
LTLA level.
● We consider age-stratified positive cases at LTLA level scaled by population size, using ages 18-24 as a 
proxy for students (we note that not all cases in this age group are students).
● Cases in the community include all other ages.
- Is there a spike or excess in expected community cases following a university outbreak?
- Do community cases grow faster following a university outbreak?
● We also consider age-stratified positive cases relative to the respective NHS region, scaled by 
population size.
- Is there proportionally higher growth in local community cases than across the region?
● Finally we consider cases at MSOA level, scaled by population size.
- Do we see more cases in locations close to areas with a high concentration of students than compared to locations further 
away from student-dominated areas?
4c. Investigating the evidence of spillover from higher 
education to the community
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● We observe a peak in student-aged 
cases in Manchester in early 
October (top panels). Student and 
community populations appear 
equally affected by late October.
● Students cases known to the 
University of Manchester (UoM) are 
reported alongside a more detailed 
breakdown of cases by age (bottom 
panels). The UoM outbreak was 
preceded by an earlier outbreak at 
Manchester Metropolitan University.
● Ages consistent with first and 
second year undergraduates are 
disproportionately affected relative to 
older age groups.
Note: The figures on the left show (in order given by legend): cases per capita for a given age group, followed by tests per capita for that age group - repeated for subsequent age 
groups. Tests are reported jointly for 18 and 19 year olds. In some cases, these have been scaled (the % value listed) to plot over the same range and aid comparison. This also 
applies to similar plots on slides 30-32.
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Redactions have been made to remove figures containing statistically disclosive / identifiable data.
● At the MSOA level, the mean scaled positive tests in areas with a known high concentration of students mirror the 
age-stratified timeline. Cases near high concentrations of students are lagged by approximately a week, and do not 
grow as much. This suggests a spread of infection from areas with a high student concentration to nearby 
surrounding areas. Other areas do not appear to be directly affected. 
● The scaled community cases are above the scaled cases across the North West, but do not experience a sustained 
growth following the peak in student cases.
30Redactions have been made to remove figures containing statistically disclosive / identifiable data.
● The situation in Manchester is in 
contrast to that in Hull - there is 
some excess in cases in early 
October following the return of 
students, but this is a weak 
signal due to the noisiness of the 
data. Student and community 
populations appear equally 
affected by late October.
● Ages consistent with first and 
second year undergraduates are 
disproportionately affected 
relative to older age groups in 
the 18-24 category.
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Redactions have been made to remove figures containing statistically disclosive / identifiable data.
● At the MSOA level, the mean scaled positive tests in areas with a known high concentration of students mirror the 
age-stratified timeline. There is a small spike in the first week of October in some areas, but the overall trend is pure 
exponential growth (with overlapping rates). This does not suggest a pattern of infection driven by areas of high 
student concentration.
● Following the peak in student cases, the scaled community cases rise sharply relative to community cases in the 
North East & Yorkshire (double the regional level in one week).
32Redactions have been made to remove figures containing statistically disclosive / identifiable data.
Caveats and limitations
● It is impossible to completely attribute a rise in community cases to an earlier or concurrent outbreak in the student 
population.
● Where indications of spillover do exist, they may also be the result of non-students aged 18-24 who seed infections 
in the wider community. 
● Outbreaks at universities may simply be a result of the increased mixing of this age bracket, and the typically larger 
household sizes in halls of residence and other shared accommodation.
Summary of findings
● Indications of student-community spillover have been found across several (but not all!) studied LTLAs. The strength 
and type of the signal varies. 
○ Some excess community cases can often be found 2-3 weeks following a sharp rise in student cases.
○ Some LTLAs with relatively low community prevalence and a significant student outbreak saw a marked 
increase in later community growth rate (or cases relative to those reported at the regional level).
○ A clear wave of infections spreading from areas of high student concentrations is rarely observed.
● There is some correlation between the size of the university outbreak, and the strength/robustness of the spillover 
signal for the different metrics.
● Assuming similar contact patterns, and allowing for the possibility of a higher community prevalence than in 2020, it 
is advisable to prepare for the possibility of future outbreaks as university students return. 
Full report with extended analysis available upon request. 
Community Spillover Summary
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